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Migration and its sources 
Migration is a subject about which it is  easy to take a myopic view. It is tempting for outsiders 
to regard migrant populations as more homogeneous than they really are, and also to focus on the 
proximate end of the migratory flow, so ignoring its geographically distant source. This is 
certainly true of most conventional understandings of Britain's non-European minorities. All too 
often, 'Asian' and 'West Indian' are uncritically assumed to be meaningful social categories, thus 
obscuring the heterogeneity of migrants' origins; emigration is not set in its historical context, so 
there is little understanding that people from those areas have moved to a wide range of different 
destinations besides Britain; and there has been so much debate about the effect of migration on 
Britain's economy and society that its impact on the migrants' own homelands has virtually been 
ignored. This article is an attempt to redress the balance, and to examine what has happened in 
two areas in the sub-continent – Jullundur in India and Mirpur in Pakistan – which have sent 
large numbers of' migrants to Britain.1 In consequence my focus here is very much on sub-
continental issues; Britain lies well on the periphery of the discussion. Yet as we shall see, events 
in Britain have many implications for India and Pakistan, and by the same token developments in 
the sub-continent may yet have an impact here. Migration is altogether more complex in both its 
context and its consequences than many commentators have yet recognised. 
Although precise figures are not available, well over half of all British South Asians originate 
from a single region – the Punjab – and within this most stem from two very restricted areas (see 
map). In Indian Punjab, the overwhelming majority of migrants come from the Jullundur Doab, a 
triangle of land lying just beneath the outer foothills of the Himalayas, and bounded to the west 
and south by the rivers Beas and Sutlej; on the Pakistani side of the border a scatter of migrants 
have arrived from right across the broad area from Sialkot to Lyallpur and beyond, but the 
heaviest flow has come from areas rather further to the north. Half – and perhaps more – of all 
Pakistani migrants in Britain stem either from Mirpur District or the neighbouring part of 
Rawalpindi District. 
Given that Mirpur lies in staunchly Muslim Pakistan, while Jullundur is a Sikh stronghold, and 
also that a bloody civil war was fought across the Indo-Pakistan border only 35 years ago, it is 
tempting to conclude that there will be few similarities between the two areas. This is, however, 
misleading. Geographically they are only 170 miles apart, and the cultural continuities between 
them are much stronger than is often supposed. In both the everyday language is Punjabi (though 
in differing dialects), while styles of dress, food preparation, family and household organisation, 
as well as modes of house building, agriculture and so forth are very similar. Jullundur may be 
dominated by the Sikhs, while virtually all Mirpuris may be Muslim, but before Partition in 1947 
both areas were much more mixed in sectarian terms. 
Yet despite these continuities, Jullundur and Mirpur Districts themselves, as well as Jullunduris 
and Mirpuris in Britain, differ quite strikingly in the amount of economic success that they have 
achieved. The Jullundur Doab is      
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now in a state of boom. Agricultural productivity is high and increasing, towns are growing 
rapidly, and industrial production is rising explosively. Mirpur presents a sharp contrast to all 
this. Although the area does not lack money – for almost every village has a bank where 
overseas migrants have left vast sums on deposit – its economy is stagnating. Considerable 
areas of land lie uncultivated, and even that which is sown is not well looked after. There are 
few roads and little agricultural machinery, and industry is virtually non-existent. The economy 
of the whole area is now largely dependent on the continued flow of migrant remittances, and 
without them extreme poverty would soon follow. Like Mirpur, Jullundur has also witnessed 
large-scale migration, but in its case economic growth, rather than debilitating dependency, has 
ensued. 
There are similar, though less dramatic differences between Jullunduri and Mirpuri settlers in 
Britain. Many Jullunduris are skilled craftsmen, and a significant proportion have started small 
businesses of one kind or another: and while it is far from unknown for Mirpuris to have moved 
off in these directions, many fewer have moved beyond semi-skilled industrial occupations, 
from which they are currently being made redundant in large numbers. 
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Given this situation, my broad purpose here is to compare and contrast the economic, social and 
political developments that have taken place in the two neighbouring Districts of Jullundur and 
Mirpur. In doing so I hope to destroy the stereotyped vision of 'the Asian background' as being 
some uniform state of poverty, and instead to highlight its dynamic variety. Even more 
importantly. I want to pose the question as to why economic processes in these two areas 
should differ so dramatically in their outcomes, and what the wider consequences of these 
differences might be. 
Agriculture in Jullundur 
The land around Jullundur is some of the most fertile in the world. It is a flat, loamy plain, on 
which it has always been possible to raise two crops a year (wheat in winter, nee or maize in 
summer). Irrigation increases yields dramatically, and in the past was achieved either by canal, 
or by raising water from wells using bullock-driven Persian wheels; but it was only possible to 
irrigate a small proportion of the land by these methods. Today, however, almost every farmer 
has installed a diesel or electric-driven tube well (water is rarely more than 20 feet down); 
these have not only greatly increased the yields of the main crops, but have allowed careful 
farmers to sow up to two additional catch crops of vegetables as well. The widespread use of 
irrigation, together with the use of new varieties of seed, fertilisers and pesticides, has 
dramatically increased levels of productivity. Jullundur, like the rest of the Indian Punjab, now 
produces a massive surplus of foodgrains, which is exported to the rest of India. 
All this has precipitated a sharp improvement in local standards of living. Most houses are 
brick-built, village streets are paved, tarmac roads run everywhere, and a wide range of 
consumer goods – from bicycles and_ sewing machines to televisions and washing machines-
are becoming commonplace. Agriculture is also becoming increasingly mechanised; in addition 
to tube wells, tractors, grain threshers and sugar-cane crushers are all in common use. 
Producing them has become the principal source of rapidly increasing urban wealth. Indeed, the 
value of Punjab's industrial production has now outstripped that of agriculture. 
Although Punjab has now become India's most prosperous province, it was not always so. A 
century ago the peasant cultivators of the region produced little more than was necessary to 
meet their subsistence needs. Though not poverty stricken in an absolute sense, for famine in 
this fertile province Was virtually unknown, the surplus they produced was small, and much of 
that was appropriated by the State as taxation. Houses were for the most, part built of sun dried 
mud bricks, streets were unpaved, and machinery was both limited and simple. It was in this 
context that overseas migration began. 
Emigration from Jullundur 
Following the Mutiny of 1857, the British authorities decided to change their recruitment 
policies, and to replace the rebellious Bengal Army with one which they considered more 
'loyal'. Since the Punjab had a military tradition, and the region had not supported the 
mutineers, it was selected as a prime area for recruitment for the new Army. Those who joined 
up were for the most part members of poorer peasant farmer families – and especially those 
with a surplus of labour due to the presence of several adult sons. Amongst those most 
frequently recruited were Jat Sikhs, especially from Jullundur District, which was then, as now, 
one of the most densely populated in the Punjab.2 
By the 1880s, soldiers of the Indian Army began to be posted abroad to help maintain order in 
Britain's still expanding Empire in the Far East. Very soon afterwards, Sikh ex-soldiers began 
to take jobs as night-watchmen and police 
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men. and also to establish small businesses in Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, so 
establishing what was to prove to be a tradition of working overseas. By the turn of the century 
Sikh pioneers were working as lumberjacks in British Columbia and as agricultural labourers in 
California. When competing peasant migrants from Europe managed to force the passage of 
immigration laws which excluded 'Asiatics' from these frontier regions, they simply turned 
elsewhere: to Burma, for instance, to the Philippines and to East Africa, where they helped to 
construct the railways in the 1930s. When British industry ran acutely short of labour during the 
years of the post-war boom the focus of emigration' moved to Southall, Birmingham and 
Bradford: and, when excluded once again by discriminatory legislation, migrants took jobs in 
Germany, Holland and Denmark, at least for as long as the boom lasted. Now that the greater part 
of the industrialised world is in the midst of deep recession, large numbers of Jullunduris have 
gone to work on construction sites in Libya, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Over a 
lengthy period they have become highly skilled at searching out opportunities to earn good 
money overseas: travel agents in every town in the Jullundur Doab can provide up-to-date 
information on the state of the labour market in all parts of the world, and can, at a price, offer 
the intending migrant all the necessary documentation to get him to wherever labour is currently 
in demand. 
Migration from Jullundur is thus in no sense a recent phenomenon: it has a long and varied 
history. Over the whole period since the imposition of British rule, however, the impetus behind 
migration has remained much the same. Adventurous young men from poorer (though not the 
poorest) families have been helped by other members of the group to invest in a ticket abroad. 
Their object in working overseas has been to accumulate substantial savings, which could then be 
used to launch both themselves and their families into a position of higher social and economic 
status.3 
Such entrepreneurial migration was quite clearly not precipitated by grinding poverty, not least 
because the poorest families could not afford the investment to send a son abroad. Instead the 
urge towards migration was primarily a product of local status competition. The majority of early 
migrants belonged to peasant farmer families whose members felt they had slipped behind their 
immediate kinsmen in status. Given the egalitarian but deeply competitive ethos which is so 
characteristic of Punjabi peasants-and particularly amongst members of the Jat caste-this was a 
galling situation in which to be, but one to which migration offered a remedy. Wealthy returnees 
could turn the tables on their rivals. 
It was as a consequence of all this that migration began to develop a dynamic of its own. 
Members of better-off families began, in their turn, to feel put down by returning migrants. Not 
only did their new-found wealth allow them to buy land and to build fine houses, but returnees 
also brought with them the fruits of their contacts with a much more affluent world. In recent 
years these have included such things as cars and video-cassette recorders. Even those with sub-
stantial landholdings could not match that kind of wealth – so they, too, began to consider 
sending at least one young man abroad. At the same time the growing affluence of the whole area 
means that even those with little or no property are now able to raise the funds necessary to 
finance migration. In 1982, a visa and accompanying documentation, together with an air ticket to 
Saudi Arabia, costs about Rs. 6,000 (about £400), a sum which even labourers could manage to 
raise. Consequently, the social range from which migrants have been drawn has widened 
considerably in recent years. 
Migration and economic growth 
Migration – or rather the remittances which migrants send back home – has brought major 
benefits to those families which have sent members overseas. Given also that the economy of 
Jullundur has grown explosively in recent years, it is tempting to conclude that the two are 
necessarily and causally linked             
- and hence that large-'scale migration will always precipitate rapid economic growth. But the 
fact that migration has not precipitated growth in Mirpur should warn us that things are not 
necessarily nearly so straightforward. 
Care must be taken to distinguish between the impact of remittances on individual households 
and their effect on the aggregate economy of the region as a whole. It is also important to avoid 
assuming that migrant remittances are the only variable that matters. and they are necessarily 
directly and causally linked to economic growth. In the case of Jullundur (and, indeed, the rest of 
the Punjab) growth has emerged primarily from a close, and increasingly successful symbiosis 
between developments in agricultural and industrial productivity. This is a story which it is worth 
setting out at some length, above all because its details are little known. 
Industrialisation in Jullundur 
Prior to the imposition of British rule the Punjab was in no sense industrialised, but craft skills in 
the working of iron and steel were comparatively well developed. Swords and cannon were 
locally produced, and craftsmen in every village were capable of making ploughs, sickles and the 
mechanically complex Persian Wheel. British rule brought much more direct access to world 
markets, and especially to goods being manufactured in Europe. Chaff-cutters and sewing 
machines were amongst the most attractive and useful products for Punjabi farmers, and from the 
turn of the century they became increasingly commonplace. 
When such machines went wrong, farmers would take them to the family blacksmith4 for repair, 
and he in turn would buy the necessary spare parts from the bazaar. But these spares were 
imported, and consequently very expensive – and many blacksmiths soon decided that they could 
make the simpler parts themselves at a much lower price. By adapting and developing their 
traditional skills, blacksmiths gradually learned to manufacture a wider and wider range of 
spares, until they were eventually able to produce the whole machine indigenously. The methods 
they used at the outset were often crude and labour-intensive, but their product was invariably 
cheap: if quality suffered it did not matter too much. Local farmers were eager to buy, especially 
if the price was low. 
By the 1930s local craftsmen were producing complete chaff-cutters and sewing machines, and 
since then they have moved on to reproduce an ever-widening range of goods, as well as the 
machine tools which are used to produce them. These goods now include bicycles, pumps, diesel 
engines, grain threshers and a wide range of spare parts for tractors, cars and trucks: and since 
competition between rival manufacturers has become ever more intense in recent years, prices 
have remained low, but quality has improved dramatically. 
Initially, the craftsmen who become manufacturers were virtually all village-based, and it was 
there that they started their factories. But as the scale of production has increased, so they have 
gradually moved into the towns, where access to raw materials and so forth is much easier. As a 
result Punjabi towns. and especially those along the Grand Trunk Road, are increasingly 
becoming hives of industry packed with innumerable small workshops. Each town also tends to 
specialise in a particular line: Jullundur in sports equipment: Phagwara in diesel engines and 
motor parts: Goraya in chaff-cutters, threshers and truck axles, Ludhiana in machine tools, 
bicycles and woollen textiles: Gobindgarh in steel re-rolling: and so forth. 
The significance of this dramatic industrial revolution is. first, that it has avoided the trap of 
dependency by relying on indigenous skills and resources. There has been no need to spend 
scarce foreign exchange to buy in technical skills and know-how: having one item to copy has 
been sufficient. Second. the fact that simple technology has been used means that production has 
been 
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labour-intensive, so creating substantial employment opportunities. Third, and perhaps most 
crucially, industrial growth has directly paralleled agricultural growth. Cheap machinery has 
found a ready market amongst farmers, and has allowed them to improve their productivity quite 
dramatically. This has in turn enhanced their purchasing power, and generated a demand for yet 
more manufactured goods. 
This complementary expansion of agricultural and industrial production still has far to run. 
Indeed, there is no reason why explosive growth of the kind that has taken place in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan in the last three decades should not occur in the Punjab. Punjabi products are already 
exported in large quantities to all parts of India, and an increasing quantity of manufactured 
goods, such as bicycles and motor spares, are now being sent abroad. 
The context of economic growth in Jullundur 
No single factor has been responsible for this process of rapid economic growth, but a number of 
important components to its development can be identified. In the first place one can point to the 
relatively egalitarian agrarian structure of the area.5 Where most farmers are owner-cultivators, as 
they are in the Punjab, they have a direct incentive to increase productivity, for they reap all the 
benefits; tenant farmers and labourers invariably see the lion's share of such increases go to their 
landlords. Secondly, one can point to the existence – and then the development – of local craft 
skills. It is upon indigenous skills, whether of farmers or craftsmen, that progress has been built. 
Thirdly, one can point to the close symbiosis between agricultural and industrial development -
each has helped to finance the other. A fourth important point – though its significance will only 
be fully apparent when we turn to consider the Pakistani economy – is that ever since 
Independence the Government of India has put tight controls on the import of manufactured 
goods. Given the shelter which these controls provided from overseas competition, Punjabi 
craftsmen have been able to move ahead very, rapidly, especially since 1947. Import controls still 
remain tight today, but for basic manufactured goods protection is less and less necessary. Indian-
made goods are increasingly competitively priced in world markets. 
Once these wider processes have been taken into account, the significance of migrant remittances 
can be put into perspective. While remittances have undoubtedly brought new-found wealth to 
individual families, they have not been primarily responsible for the process of growth itself. 
Two additional pieces of evidence can be advanced to support this view. On the one hand, the 
scale of economic growth – in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors – has not been 
much less in Ludhiana than in Jullundur District, despite the fact that the former has sent many 
fewer migrants abroad.6 On the other hand, in Jullundur itself only a small proportion of the most 
prosperous farmers and industrialists are ex-migrants. By and large their working capital has been 
locally generated. 
None of this is to suggest that migrant remittances have hindered economic growth, or that 
migrant's contacts with a wider world in which they learned new skills and ideas have not been a 
basis for local initiatives, but it must be stressed that the central driving force in local economic 
growth has not come from this source. What has been most crucial has been local entrepreneurial 
activity in agriculture, industry and commerce, and the growth of a flourishing symbiosis between 
these three sectors. Migrant remittances may have added gilt to the gingerbread-but they have not 
produced the gingerbread itself. 
Social change in Jullundur 
Before going on to consider the very different part which migration and migrant remittances play 
in the economy of Mirpur, and beyond that in the political economy of Pakistan as a whole, we 
must pay brief attention to the very considerable social changes which have taken place in 
Jullundur as a result of rapid economic growth. It is perhaps more important to emphasise that  
everyone has benefited from this process. Standards of living have improved dramatically over 
the past few decades. Everyone is better off than they used to be-so much so that the Punjab itself 
has now attracted substantial numbers of immigrants, most of them drawn from the much poorer 
areas in the eastern part of Northern India. 
The fact that prosperity has come to the Punjab does not mean that the benefits of economic 
growth have been equally shared. Those with property. w Nether in land, machinery or a business, 
have done very much better than those with nothing to sell but their labour. Farmers with fair-
sized holdings- say 15 acres or above – are now becoming wealthy men, though with classic 
peasant frugality they have not necessarily altered their lifestyles dramatically. What is more 
obvious in Jullundur District, as in the rest of Punjab, is the existence of a burgeoning middle 
class, whose members live in increasing opulence in spacious residential colonies now being laid 
out on the outskirts of most towns. 
Meanwhile village life has been transformed. The traditional inter-caste reciprocities, where 
members of different castes provided specialist services for one another in return for payments in 
kind, have almost entirely broken down. Such transactions are now virtually all short-term, 
closely bargained, and accounts are rendered in cash. Beyond this, the whole agrarian structure is 
being re-ordered. Peasant farmers with relatively small holdings (which today is beginning to 
include all those with less than ten acres) are finding it increasingly difficult to make a good 
living from agriculture. They simply do not have the resources to farm profitably, now that 
agriculture has become increasingly mechanised and capital-intensive. 
Even so there are various opportunities open to such families. Migration has long been an option, 
but it is one which is becoming less attractive. Wages in the Middle East (the only place where 
jobs are currently available on any scale) are dropping, and are well below the levels of those 
which used to be available in Britain. Moreover, the conditions under which migrants have to 
work in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia are known to be appalling. As an alternative to migration, 
however, a range of local alternatives is now available, of which three are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, there is the possibility of selling up completely and buying new land away to the east in 
Uttar Pradesh, where land of identical quality costs only a tenth of the price of that in Jullundur. 
Secondly, there is the possibility of moving into agro-business, such as intensive chicken farming 
or milk production. Failing either of these, ex-farmers are increasingly turning towards the towns, 
either to work for wages, or (preferably) to start a business of one kind or another. 
Even more dramatic changes have begun to emerge at the lower end of the caste and status 
hierarchy. Approximately 30 per cent of the rural population traditionally worked as landless 
labourers, and most were of the Chamar or Leatherworker caste. Such labourers have long 
resented their exploitation. and most, especially the patronising treatment they received from 
their Jat Sikh landlords; whatever Guru Nanak may have taught about the meaninglessness of the 
concept of caste, Jats have always treated Chamars (and, indeed. all non-Jats) as their inferiors. 
As agricultural prosperity increased in Punjab, so Chamars (or Ad-dharmis, as they now call 
themselves) began to bargain up their wages, but in recent years they have begun to move 
completely away from their traditional occupation. The great majority now make their living in 
the towns, and particularly in the new factories which have grown up so rapidly; and given this 
access to much higher urban wages, a considerable number have invested in tickets to the Gulf, 
most usually with the aim of establishing their own workshop with their accumulated savings on 
their return. 
But as the Ad-dharmis have moved out of agriculture, so a new group has replaced them. In 
recent years large numbers of immigrant workers have arrived in Jullundur and, indeed, in all 
parts of the Punjab. Known collectively as bhaiya. the great majority of these immigrants come 
from peasant families in much less prosperous parts of north India, and especially from eastern  
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UP and Bihar. They have sought work in Punjab for just the same reasons as did the Jullunduris 
overseas: but because their villages are so much less developed than the Punjab, and because 
the market for migrants has become so much more competitive, buying a railway ticket to 
Jullundur is the most that they can afford. 
It is illuminating to consider the parallels between immigration to the Punjab and immigration to 
Britain. Just as acute shortages of labour drew Punjabis to Britain, so bhaiyas have been drawn to 
the Punjab. These shortages can be traced in part to overseas migration itself, but more 
significantly to the determined most of Ad-dharmis out of agriculture, together with increasing 
demands for labour precipitated by booming agricultural output. But agricultural work is very 
poorly paid. With the exception of harvest time (when rates can double or even treble) labourers 
receive Rs. 10 per day or Rs. 300 (about £20) per month. Skilled industrial workers can currently 
make Rs. 600 per month (the figures here refer to 1982), a fact which only reinforces the Ad-
dharmis' determination to get off the land. 
But bhaiya migrants are. of course, interested in industrial jobs for just the same reason, and a 
considerable number have now forced their way in – in the face of considerable Ad-dharmi 
resistance. That section of Punjab's proletariat which has indigenous roots is becoming 
increasingly hostile towards the bhaiyas. They feel that the local labour market is now becoming 
flooded by immigrants, whose presence tends to undermine their own bargaining position. In a 
final paradox, the despised bhaiyas are mostly peasant farmers by origin. They therefore have a 
higher formal caste status than do the Ad-dharmis.' Nevertheless, both are looked down on as 
being social inferiors by the Jats and Ramgarhias, who are themselves treated in much the same 
way when they migrate to Britain.7 
Mirpur and its economy 
How does all this compare and contrast with Mirpur? In the first place it must be stressed that 
Mirpur is rather less well situated environmentally than is Jullundur. While Jullundur lies astride 
the Grand Trunk Road, which always was, and still remains, the major channel of communication 
for the whole of Northern India, Mirpur lies a few miles to the north of it. and is connected only 
by a single spur. Moreover, the District lies within the outer ranges of the Himalayan foothills: 
because it is not absolutely flat, like Jullundur, comprehensive irrigation is much more difficult to 
achieve. On the other hand, rainfall is a good deal higher, making irrigation less absolutely 
necessary, while hills and rivers offer all sorts of opportunities for dam construction. 
Much of Mirpur District consists of substantial areas of reasonably flat plateau, split up by 
occasional rocky outcrops and precipitous ravines. This seems to have made the whole area into 
something of a haven. Throughout known history invaders have swcpt into India through the 
plains of the Punjab, so villages in Jullundur have always been exposed to marauders. Mirpur's 
terrain offered a considerable degree of shelter, which may explain why the area has always been 
comparatively densely populated. and certainly a consequence of that high population density has 
been that over the last century or so large numbers of Mirpuris have sought work outside their 
own District. 
As has already been suggested. however, nothing like the economic development which is so 
characteristic of Jullundur has taken place in Mirpur. Industry is virtually non-existent, and 
agriculture – both in terms of the area ploughed, and of yield – is in decline. While migrant 
remittances have helped to boost an already expanding economy in Jullundur, a very similar flow 
of resources has actually precipitated economic decline in Mirpur, for the whole area is becoming 
ever more dependent on migrant remittances. Without a constant flow of funds from overseas,  
 
Mirpur – and, indeed, Pakistan itself – would be bankrupt. The remainder of this article will be 
devoted to examining just how and why migrant remittances have come to play such a very 
different kind of role in two neighbouring, and originally very similar areas. 
Emigration in Mirpur 
The earliest significant movement of migrants away from Mirpur seems to have begun just before 
the turn of the century, as men sought jobs on the dockside in Bombay. As every year passed the 
port became busier, and soon Mirpuris began to seek work afloat. Within a few years they began 
to establish a niche for themselves as engine-room stokers. This was one of the hardest and most 
uncomfortable jobs available. Not only was it extremely dirty, but in tropical conditions engine-
room temperatures could easily reach 140°F. Yet from a Mirpuri perspective the job offered good 
money, and so there were plenty of takers. The most usual pattern of recruitment was for a 
serang (the engine-room foreman) to return to his village to recruit the men he needed from 
amongst his neighbours' and kinsmen's families. Those villages with several serangs soon gained 
(and still retain) a reputation for wealth. 
Mirpuris began to take jobs as stokers just before the beginning of the First World War, and this 
was the trade in which they specialised until the end of the second one. During this period very 
few took jobs ashore anywhere overseas. But the Second World War and its aftermath changed all 
this. During the war itself a huge demand developed for tough male labour, especially in the 
munitions factories in the Midlands and North of England. Mirpuri seamen – many of whom had 
had their ships torpedoed beneath them – began to be drafted towards these jobs, the more so 
since they were both able and willing to take on hot and heavy foundry work.8 
In the immediate post-war period Mirpuri migration to Britain began to increase, for reasons 
which have as much to do with developments in the subcontinent as they do with Britain. On the 
one hand, the availability of seaborne jobs began to dry up. Not only were coal-fired ships being 
phased out very rapidly, so lessening the demand for stokers, but the partition of Pakistan from 
India in 1947 meant that Mirpuris now had to cross a disputed international frontier before they 
could reach Bombay. Meanwhile the accelerating post-war boom soon began to generate an 
increasing demand for labour in Britain. Not only did ex-seamen come to join their compatriots 
who had settled in Britain during the war, but within a few years they began to send back word to 
their kinsmen, instructing them how to get to Britain to take advantage of the new opportunities 
that were opening up. 
Just as in Jullundur, the migratory connection soon developed its own dynamic, once pioneering 
links had been established. But in the Mirpuri case two additional factors are worth mentioning. 
The first was the building of the Mangla Dam across the River Jhelum on the southern part of the 
District during the early 1960s. This resulted in the flooding of some of the area's best 
agricultural land, and although compensation was paid by the Government, many regarded what 
they received as grossly inadequate. Worse still, it was extremely difficult for farmers to buy new 
land to replace that which they had lost. Although relatively few people had emigrated from the 
area which disappeared under the lake, everyone knew about the opportunities available in 
Britain, for migrants from more remote villages passed through that area on their way out of the 
District. Faced with the loss of their land, many Mirpuris whose villages were submerged took 
advantage of the short-lived voucher system to enter Britain between 1962 and 1966. They 
rapidly found employment, particularly in heavy engineering and the textile industry. 
Since 1966 it has become progressively more difficult for adult males from the sub-continent to 
enter Britain, thanks to increasingly stringent immigration 
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legislation. But in the Mirpuri case the pressure to migrate has remained intense, above all 
because there are so few local opportunities to make money. In sharp contrast to Jullundur, the 
rural economy is moving backwards, not forwards, in terms of both yields and productivity. 
Largely because of unmechanised agricultural methods, a farmer's life is still one of back-
breaking toil. So that even those with substantial landholdings see work abroad as offering better 
prospects than staying back home. On the other hand, the geographical target for migration has 
changed in the last few years. Visitors back on holiday from Britain can be found everywhere, 
and as a result it is now well known that unemployment is widespread, that jobs are virtually 
impossible to find, and that racialist abuse is commonplace. So ambitious young men now set 
their sights on a visa which will allow them to work in Libya, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab 
Emirates. These visas (invariably purchased through the agents of labour contractors) now cost 
Rs. 15,000 or more. whereas wages for a labourer in the Middle East are rarely much more than 
Rs. 2.500 per month, so that migration now no longer represents a means of gaining access to 
instant wealth.9 In the absence of any better opportunities, however, there is now a steady flow of 
Mirpuris – and, indeed, of people from many other parts of Pakistan – to the Middle East. 
Migrant remittances 
Even though Mirpuris tend to be far more strongly committed to emigration than are Jullunduris, 
if only because local economic opportunities are so much more limited, they tend to keep in 
closer touch with their homeland. There are two main reasons why this should be so: first, they 
have tended to delay reuniting their families overseas for rather longer than did the Jullunduris;9 
and second, those of their kin who have remained at home have become increasingly dependent 
on regular remittances to maintain their living standards. Sometimes this reflects a real lack of 
local resources; more usually land is available. but it is simply not being cultivated as profitably 
as it might be, very often because no one but women, children and the elderly can be found at 
home. 
The impact of large-scale migrant remittances is clearly visible throughout the District. New 
brick houses are being built, new shop units are being constructed, and large numbers of Ford 
Transits- most of which have been driven out overland from Britain – ply for hire as mini-buses 
along the roads. But most striking of all is the number of banks. They are to be found 
everywhere, even in the smallest villages, and virtually all their deposits come from overseas. 
Thus far it might seem that there are parallels with Jullundur: but where Mirpur differs is that 
there has been an almost total lack of productive investment in either agriculture or 
manufacturing. A substantial proportion of migrant remittances simply lies in deposit accounts in 
the bank, and real economic activity is confined almost entirely to the service sector, which in 
turn needs a constant flow of remittances to keep it in business. 
The land is, of course, the District's major asset, but not only is it far less intensively cultivated 
than that in Jullundur, but large areas of excellent land have simply been abandoned. When all the 
males of a family have gone overseas, the most use made of such land is to graze a few goats over 
it. Beyond this there is a marked absence of agricultural machinery. Tractors are hardly to be 
seen, there are no tube wells or small-scale dam irrigation schemes, and hardly any chaff -cutters. 
Agricultural methods are still of the traditional labour intensive kind, and rely primarily on 
human and animal muscle power. 
Alongside all this, there has been very little investment of a kind which could boost women's 
domestic productivity – and make their lives a good deal easier. For example, women in virtually 
all villages still have to spend a great deal of time fetching water by hand from the nearest well or 
stream. Despite sparkling new houses, and banks which are bursting with cash, simple hand-
pumps – which have been commonplace in Jullundur for many years – are hardly ever to be seen. 
 
As a consequence of its low levels of agricultural productivity. Mirpur District is no longer self-
sufficient even in food grains: large quantities of wheat are imported from elsewhere in Pakistan. 
All this makes for a great deal of activity in the towns and smaller rural bazaars, but what is most 
striking is that the whole economy is predicated around the continued flow of migrant remit-
tances. Virtually nothing is exported, but a huge range of goods – from cloth and cement to steel 
reinforcing bars and motor cycles – are imported. A huge service economy has grown up around 
this trade. Wood is brought into the towns in vast quantities every day, for cooking and brick 
making. Roads are few, so there are a multiplicity of camel and mule drivers redistributing goods 
to the interior and, of course, all these animals have to be fed. Many farmers are being drawn into 
the urban cash economy, selling half-mature crops as fodder, or taking time off to fetch wood 
from the higher mountains. 
However superficially lively this market-based economy may be, it has already run into problems 
of over-capacity. Every bazaar contains long lines of shop units built speculatively for rent, but 
very often less than half of them are actually occupied, and business in those that are is very 
desultory. Similarly, there are by now far more mini-buses plying for hire than there are 
passengers available to fill them. What soon emerges is that Mirpur has an excess of entre-
preneurs as compared with opportunities to make money, most especially in the rural areas from 
which the overseas migrants come. 
Mirpur and Jullundur contrasted 
A comparison of Mirpur with Jullundur soon makes it clear that migrant remittances alone cannot 
precipitate real economic growth. On the contrary. Unless the local economy is in a very sound 
condition, a huge flow of cash resources tends to stifle rather than stimulate such growth. The 
reasons are not hard to identify. A migrant returning to Jullundur looking for a profitable way of 
utilising his savings has innumerable role models to follow. He can farm – or go into intensive 
egg production. He can start a small engineering workshop or open a shop, or perhaps set up in 
the transport business; but whatever his decision he is likely to take advice and assistance from a 
kinsman or friend who is already established in that line. Such returnees are not pioneering entre-
preneurs, at least in the first instance, in their activities back home. They follow others, and join 
in an already established process. This is not the case in Mirpur. Such local activity as exists is 
almost entirely run and financed by returnees; and since it is concentrated overwhelmingly in the 
service sector rather than in directly productive industry and agriculture, the whole system is 
increasingly dependent on remittances from overseas. 
The low level of agricultural and industrial activity also has very significant effect on the 
everyday behaviour of Mirpuri returnees, and most especially the men. While women are 
expected to participate fully in the domestic economy, men seek to avoid any kind of contact with 
agriculture, regarding it as far below their dignity. Instead, having supervised the building of a 
house which they hope will be the envy of their neighbours, most men aim simply to lounge 
around in style. Apart from drinking endless cups of tea, one of their most passionate activities is 
the training of fighting cocks, and then betting on the outcome of their battles. If they do get 
involved in activities which might result in real profit, their preference is to avoid physical work. 
If returnees have any long-term aims, it is to be successful rentiers. 
Such success is, however, difficult to achieve; fighting cocks, shop units and mini-buses rarely 
bring a significant income. Thus, returnees tend to live like princes until their money runs out, 
whereupon they have little alternative but to return to the treadmill overseas to try to earn some 
more. Those returning to the Middle East do at least have a chance of getting work, however low-
paid, but some of the saddest cases to be met are young men who have come back for an extended 
holiday, having been made redundant in Britain. Life in a small town, or in a remote village in the 
interior of Mirpur soon begins to pall, for 
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there is so little to do-at least as they see it. Many commented that their most positive possession 
was a British passport, which would at least enable them to go back and claim the dole.  
Some parallels to all of this can, of course, be found in Jullundur. Returning migrants everywhere 
usually find that the cost of living back home is greater than they remembered, particularly when 
all one's kinsmen have been given the gifts they feel they deserve. Similarly, the easiest way to 
demonstrate that one has become a man of some status is to refuse to get one's hands dirty. Yet 
returning Jullunduris do not generally keep themselves so elaborately distanced from farm work 
as do Mirpuris. Partly this is a consequence of the level of technology involved – there is much 
less resistance to driving a tractor than a pair of bullocks – and partly a matter of the inherent 
profitability of the activity. Farmer is a thoroughly respectable title to have in Jullundur: it is not 
in Mirpur. 
What I am suggesting is that migrant remittances set off a spiral of activities, and that this spiral 
may either go upwards or downwards. Where the local economy remains in good shape. As in 
Jullundur, the spiral is in an upward direction. But where the local economy is stagnating (and 
this stagnation may itself be precipitated by the absence of large numbers of men abroad) 
precisely the opposite process occurs. People do less and less. 
Faced with clear signs of inactivity, it is easy to conclude that it must arise from some kind of 
cultural backwardness. Indeed, this explanation of the causes of Mirpuri 'backwardness' is very 
popular amongst non-Mirpuris, and especially amongst Government officers who administrate the 
area. Mirpuris, they helpfully explain to visitors and to each other, are backward, ill-educated and 
lazy, and they have been spoiled by too much money. But plausible though this may seem at first 
sight – for instance, as one watches the audience for a cock-fight gather – closer scrutiny soon 
reveals its absurdity. Mirpuris were after all, employed as seamen precisely because of their 
ability, and their willingness, to perform arduous tasks in extremely adverse conditions. Mirpuris 
in Britain have continued to do just that. There is no lack of money in Mirpur District itself: there 
can be few other places in the third world which are so capital rich. Yet development stubbornly 
refuses to take place. The reasons for this must be sought, I would suggest, not in the psychology 
of Mirpuris or the 'traditionalism' of their culture, but in the structural context in which they find 
themselves. 
Mirpur as a dependent periphery 
In political and economic terms Mirpur has a long history of dependency. During the days of the 
British Raj, Mirpur did not lie in British-administered territory, as did Jullundur, but formed the 
southern boundary of the Maharaja of Kashmir’s territories. Since it was so peripheral to the 
kingdom, however, it was largely left undeveloped. A single road led up through the District to 
the interior, local administration was both exploitative and inefficient, and public services, such 
as education, were virtually non-existent. At Independence in 1947 the Hindu Maharaja chose to 
affiliate his predominantly Muslim kingdom to India, and a civil war which was at least as bitter 
as that waged in Punjab broke out. In Mirpur most of the merchants and shopkeepers had been 
Sikhs: they were all either killed or expelled. Meanwhile the District itself formed a part of the 
narrow strip of territory which eventually fell to Pakistan, and which is now known as Azad 
(free) Kashmir. But the boundary just to the north is still only a cease-fire line. Pakistan still 
claims that the remainder of Kashmir should not form part of India, while India claims Kashmir 
for itself. 
Greatly to the Government of Pakistan's embarrassment, however, a strong anti-Pakistan 
movement now flourishes in Azad Kashmir, and this is particularly well supported in Mirpur 
District. The movement demands that the whole of Kashmir be made truly Azad, not just from 
India, but from Pakistan as well – and goes on to cast Pakistan in the role of exploiter. Pakistan, 
the movement's supporters suggest, receives many benefits from Mirpur. As a result of the 
construction of the Mangla Dam it gets huge supplies of water for irrigation, as well as hydro-
electricity. It gets timber from the District's forests but most of the saw-mills are in the plains. 
Above all it gets the benefits of the many crores of rupees earned by Mirpuris overseas, which are 
deposited by Pakistani banks. In return, they argue, Mirpur gets virtually nothing. Not only has 
the best agricultural land in the District, as well as its two major towns. Mirpur and Dadial, been 
drowned beneath the rising waters of the lake, but the compensation which was paid was pitifully 
small. Both Mirpur and Dadial have been rebuilt anew on higher ground, but the capital for their 
construction has overwhelmingly come from overseas, and both have lost a good deal of their 
spirit in the process. Most serious of all, the whole infrastructure of communications, which was 
destroyed by the rising waters, has only been replaced at a snail's pace. The whole District has 
only a single hard top road, which winds its way lengthily around the lake, but that was only 
completed in the mid-1970s, a decade after the construction of the dam. Most strikingly of all, the 
bridge over the River Poonch to Tehsil Dadial- which has sent a higher proportion of migrants 
overseas than any other- was only completed in 1980. As Dadialis bitterly point out, electricity 
from Mangla reached Karachi, 2.000 miles to the south, long before it reached their own area, and 
there is still no progress towards building a bridge across the Jhelum to give them direct access to 
the plains. However great the benefits that Mangla may have brought to Pakistan, Mirpur has 
experienced it only as a handicap. 
With this in mind, the stagnation of the Mirpuri economy can be seen in a very different light. 
Though the area has long been capital-rich as a consequence of migrant remittances, it has 
nevertheless been systematically under-developed as a consequence of policy decisions taken by 
Governments located elsewhere, to whom the interests of the local population have been of little 
importance. 
Prior to Independence, Mirpur was on the periphery of Kashmir State. Far distant from Srinigar 
and Jammu, it was given little in the way of roads, schools and other public services. Today 
Mirpur remains on the periphery, this time of Pakistan; and its economy is still being manipulated 
to the advantage of outsiders. Mangla Dam required massive public funding, but the benefits of 
that investment have gone elsewhere. The costs have been born in Mirpur. Even more important, 
the remittances sent back by Mirpuri workers overseas have come to play a vital role in the 
Pakistani economy, while at the same time debilitating the local economy of Mirpur. A fuller 
understanding of just how that has occurred can only be achieved by broadening our focus still 
further, to considering the major features of Pakistan's economy, and the role which migration 
and migrant remittances play within it. 
The wider context of the Pakistani economy 
Over the years Pakistan's economy has gradually become increasingly dependent on migrant 
remittances, so much so that 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings now come 
from this source. The only other significant exports are cotton, rice, and carpets, which are 
currently dropping in terms of both volume and value. The scale of emigration from Pakistan is 
dramatically large. Some two million Pakistanis, nearly 10 per cent of the country's adult male 
manpower, now work overseas. This development is generally welcomed by the Government, 
whose spokesmen suggest that remittances can play a vital role in fostering economic 
development in a country which is rich in manpower but very short of other resources. As a 
consequence, Pakistan now has a policy of encouraging as much emigration as possible.10 In 
view of what has already been said about the impact of migration on the economy of Mirpur the 
claim that emigration will necessarily have a beneficial effect on the sending society needs to 
be treated with considerable scepticism. But before pursuing this further it is worth taking a 
brief look at Pakistan's economic history, most particularly to make a comparison with what has 
gone on in India. 
128 
As has already been stressed, India has had a long-standing commitment to economic self-
reliance. Strict controls, which virtually amount to an embargo, have been placed on the import of 
consumer goods. It was behind this protective barrier that small-scale industrialisation in Indian 
Punjab has developed. In Pakistan no such protective embargo has been established. 
Manufactured goods can be imported quite freely, provided that import duties are paid-and such 
duties are now the largest single source of revenue available to the Government. The result of all 
this is that one's initial impression of Pakistan – and particularly urban Pakistan – is that it is a 
much more affluent country than India. The streets are full of comfortable Japanese cars, while 
colour televisions are freely available in the bazaar. But closer inspection very soon reveals the 
thinness of the veneer. Such imported goods are only available to a tiny urban elite, whose 
members have a higher standard of living than many of their Indian counterparts. But not only is 
this elite much smaller in proportional terms, but the inequality between this group and the urban 
proletariat, and still more the mass of the rural population, is much wider in Pakistan than it is in 
India. 
A single example will have to suffice here. In India bicycles have now become a commonplace, 
and most particularly so in Punjab. At a cost of Rs. 400 (about £25) they are within virtually 
everyone's reach, and possession of a bike (as with a car in more affluent countries) dramatically 
enhances personal mobility. In Pakistan, however, bicycles are rarely seen. Locally-made ones 
cost twice11 as much as their Indian counterparts, and their quality is very poor: they tend to fall 
apart. Thus, if young men in Pakistan set their sights anywhere it is on buying an imported 
Yamaha-and to find the money to do so they will almost certainly have to go and work overseas. 
The availability of imported goods, albeit at high prices, has put tremendous pressure on 
Pakistan's fledgling industries. Unable to compete, many manufacturing industries have gone into 
decline in recent years. Where they have not been nationalised, their owners have switched from 
producing to importing. Even more importantly, rural industrialisation of the kind described for 
Jullundur has not taken off-. The potential was certainly there, for Muslim craftsmen have long 
had a reputation for excellence, and in the immediate post-Partition period they began to move in 
the same direction as their Jullundur compatriots. But development has been stifled, partly 
because of the absence of protective tariffs, and even more importantly because the demand for 
cheap manufactured goods from the rural areas has been much more limited.12 
It is not only in Mirpur that agriculture is under-developed: the same is true of virtually the whole 
of Pakistan. It is particularly instructive to compare the level and quality of agricultural activity 
in villages on opposite sides of the border in the plains proper, where the underlying 
environmental conditions are essentially identical. What soon becomes clear is that Pakistan is far 
behind India in the provision of a basic infrastructure in rural areas. Thus, immediately one 
crosses to Pakistani Punjab13 roads become much poorer, electricity connections fewer, and in 
many villages fertility is declining rapidly because of excessive water logging. The answer to the 
latter problem is well known. Drains need to be constructed. Those on the Indian side of the 
border are deep and well-built, but those in Pakistan are fewer in number, and very often too 
shallow, wrongly sited or silted up. Beyond this machinery is much more scarce. Tractors and 
tube wells are rarely seen, and are very much more expensive to buy. Without the facilities which 
are now commonplace on the Indian side of the border Pakistani farmers cannot produce a 
substantial surplus, and thus they do not generate a significant demand on the manufacturing 
sector. The symbiotic interdependence between the industrial and agricultural sectors which lies 
at the heart of Jullundur's growing wealth cannot take off in these conditions. 
 
 
 
Stagnation,  migration and the el i te  
Though rural stagnation is widespread in Pakistan, it should not be thought that the country's 
economy is inactive. Far from it: but as was stressed earlier, the economy is run largely for the 
benefit of the urban elite. This immediately becomes apparent when we consider; just how it is 
that the import of manufactured goods is actually paid for. In the period immediately after Inde-
pendence, Bengali jute was Pakistan's most important source of foreign exchange. The fact that 
this money was very largely used to finance imports into the politically dominant Western wing 
of the country was one of the principal reasons why Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in the 
early 1970s. But just as this occurred, so remittances from Mirpuri migrants in Britain began to 
reach their peak. Thus Pakistan's imports could still be paid for, despite the loss of its main 
source of hard currency. With the onset of recession in Britain, together with the reuniting of 
migrant families, the volume of remittances from Britain to Pakistan has also declined yen 
considerably in recent years. At the same time,-however, a new source of income has pro-
videntially emerged, for over 80 per cent of migrant remittances to Pakistan now arrive from the 
Middle East. 
Yet the whole policy of depending on an ever increasing flow of migrant remittances to sustain an 
import-based economy is becoming increasingly precarious. Even before the recent fall in both 
the price and production of oil, the demand for unskilled labour in the Middle East had passed its 
peak. If the Arab oil producers were to be forced to cut back on construction projects in the same 
way as Nigeria, the consequences for Pakistan's economy, let alone for individual migrants, 
would be severe indeed. Moreover, there is little sign of a new demand for unskilled labour 
developing anywhere else in the world, for newly-emergent industries are rarely labour intensive. 
As a source of foreign exchange, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf may be the end of the road. 
Short-sighted though all this may be, the strategy is not without its beneficiaries and supporters. 
Thus far, Pakistan's elite – senior officers in the armed forces and the civil service, together with 
the largest merchants and landowners – have done well out of it. Large flows of cash from 
overseas mean that they have easy access to imported goods, and that foreign travel (and overseas 
investment) poses few problems. Pakistan's basic policy of free trade, along with its 
encouragement of the free movement of labour, also finds favour with both the World Bank and 
the United States. But one does not have to look far to find its adverse effects. The development 
potential in migrant remittances has largely been expended on consumer goods, leaving little or 
nothing over to invest in a sounder rural infrastructure. In its absence no significant growth in 
either agricultural or industrial activity can be expected. 
Mirpur's under-development is therefore best understood not so much as the outcome of the 
innate backwardness of Mirpuri culture, but rather as a consequence of the broader structural 
conditions in which Mirpuris find themselves enmeshed. As their history shows, they have been 
at least as entrepreneurially minded as have Jullunduris: it is the local contexts within which 
they have been operating that have differed. 
Yet, as in most other structures of inequality, those destined to be losers do gain some short-
term benefits as individuals from their situation. Migrants acquire cash savings to which they 
would otherwise not have access. But in the absence of profitable investment opportunities at 
home, those savings soon run out, and then there is little alternative to another spell of 
labouring overseas. And at what cost? Nowhere are migrant workers well treated, and those last 
in the line have to be content with the least pickings. As many Pakistanis are now ruefully 
aware, migrant labourers have far fewer legal and civic rights in the Arab world than they do 
even in Britain. More galling still is the fact that in the former case the agents of their situation 
are fellow Muslims. 
131 
Just how much longer all this can be sustained is an open question. Although emigration is now a 
Pakistan-wide phenomenon, the system has been longest established in Mirpur, and it is here that 
the loudest rumblings of disquiet can be heard. Returning migrants have given an impetus to the 
demand that Kashmir be reunited and made truly Azad, but at the same time have focussed 
attention on a much wider range of social issues. Ever more pointed questions about who are the 
real beneficiaries of Pakistan's political and economic order are being asked. All this lay behind 
the large-scale disturbances which took place in Mirpur in the autumn of 1981. The 
demonstrations were put down by the police, but the issues remain very much alive, not least 
amongst the Mirpuri diaspora overseas. 14 
Jullundur and Mirpur from a British perspective 
However similar social and cultural life in Jullundur and Mirpur may have been in the past, the 
wider processes in which the two Districts are caught up, and the differential nature of their 
incorporation into the global political economy, have produced extensive differences in 
outcomes. There is no space here even to begin to set out the full range of these differences, let 
alone to examine the details of their causes and consequences. But in the context of this journal, it 
is worth exploring, by way of a conclusion, the implications of these differences for Mirpuris and 
Jullunduris living in Britain. 
Perhaps most important, it should be clear that, as a result of the economic and political processes 
at work at both ends of the migratory chain, Mirpuris are currently finding their options much 
more seriously limited than are Jullunduris. Let me draw some of the threads together. Largely as 
a result of Mirpur's peripheral position in both Kashmir and Pakistan, public services most 
especially in education – have been available on a much lesser scale than in Jullundur. Given the 
area's lack of economic progress, Mirpuris tend to have much less education, much less fluency in 
English, and many fewer marketable skills than do Jullunduris. Hence they are disproportionately 
concentrated in the least favoured sections of the British labour market, that is semi-skilled jobs 
in undercapitalised industries such as textiles and heavy engineering. Since it is precisely these 
industries that are being devastated in the current recession, Mirpuris are losing their jobs with 
even greater frequency than Jullunduris. There is, however, no need to turn to rely on theories of 
cultural 'backwardness' to explain Mirpuris' relative poverty either in Britain or the Punjab. 
Structural explanations are quite sufficient. 
Even though Mirpuris are being more severely hit than most migrants, they are not, of course, the 
only people who are suffering, nor is this the only way in which the recession is putting pressure 
on Britain's minority population. Majority hostility towards the minorities is directed equally at 
all so-called 'immigrants', be they Jullunduri or Mirpuri, first or second generation, employed or 
unemployed. As 'immigrants', all are classified as outsiders who are not properly a part of British 
society. In the face of this even those who have sunk deep roots in Britain, such as the British-
born children of immigrant parents, are beginning to consider the option of going back home with 
increasing seriousness. 
In this context it is worth remembering that most migrants regard their home villages as their 
ultimate refuge. Many only saw migration overseas as a temporary move, and as a prelude to 
retiring to a comfortable old age with a newly-built house and a well-equipped farm back home – 
and during the first half of this century many migrants did return to both Mirpur and Jullundur to 
fulfil precisely this goal. The volume of return migration from Britain has been rather small so 
far, mainly because families have been reunited here, and people reaching retiring age have not 
wished to leave their children and grandchildren behind. But recession, and above all the rising 
impact of racial hostility, is beginning to add a new dimension to these calculations. 
 
132 
More and more people are concerned about their own physical safety, and deeply disturbed about 
the future prospects for their children. And while the younger generation may have much greater 
confidence, and so are much more willing to confront English hostility than their parents were, 
their job prospects in Britain are bleak in the extreme. Hence, people of all ages are beginning to 
examine the prospect of moving on far more seriously. 
The prospects for returnees 
Although all South Asians in Britain face similar problems, the resources and opportunities open 
to those who consider returning home differ enormously, depending on their precise area of 
origin. Jullunduris have an extremely wide range of opportunities available to them, provided that 
they can take back either a reasonable amount of capital, or marketable skills, or preferable both. 
It is worth remembering that, in sub-continental terms, a substantial proportion of migrants in 
Britain have access to considerable capital assets. For instance, a 'cheap' terraced house sold for 
£10,000 will raise nearly two lakhs of rupees- quite enough to start up a business back home. In 
Jullundur's thriving economy, moreover, it is not difficult to identify all sorts of positive business 
opportunities. Alongside this the scale of industrial growth means that there is an increasing 
demand for highly skilled engineers – in metal processing, ceramics, electronics and computing, 
for instance. Standards of living may still be much lower than they are in Britain, but they seem 
set to rise quite rapidly. As the differential between Britain and Punjab declines, so the prospect 
of returning is becoming increasingly attractive. Potential returnees are also realising that they 
need not return to their parents' villages. Those with professional qualifications can now hope to 
step directly into the world of the local elite should they go back home, and that sort of life, in a 
spacious modern flat where servants are taken as a matter of course, is by no means 
uncomfortable. 
It would be quite wrong to suggest that large numbers of younger, professionally qualified people 
have yet returned to the sub-continent – but individual examples can certainly be cited. As 
growing numbers of British-born Jullunduris emerge from the universities, however, as jobs 
become more scarce, as racial hostility becomes more intense, and as India's economy expands, 
so the attractiveness of retracing their parents' steps will increase. 
In all of this the crucial point is obviously the very positive state of the local economy in 
Jullundur. Going back is becoming increasingly attractive precisely because standards of living 
are rising rapidly, and because there is a multitude of opportunities in industry, agriculture, 
business and the professions. But little of this applies to Mirpur. As has already been suggested, 
Mirpuris are being harder hit by the British recession than are Jullunduris, so they have greater 
reason to consider going back. Indeed, the presence of temporary visitors sounding out local 
prospects is much more apparent in Mirpur than Jullundur, but as yet very few indeed have 
identified a viable way of making a decent living. The service sector is so crowded as to make 
new enterprises unprofitable, and those pitched elsewhere seem doomed to failure. Many Mirpuri 
migrants own a fair amount of land, but anyone planning to return as a farmer faces major 
difficulties. While it would be feasible to irrigate a good deal of the land, pumping sets are not 
available, and low-level dams in the ravines have yet to be built. Similarly, high-yielding seeds 
are not easily available, nor are tractors, transport, fertilisers and so forth. Jullunduri farmers can 
take the availability of all these for granted, and returning migrants can take advice from 
neighbours about the most profitable modes of cultivation. Mirpuris trying to do the same would 
have to start from scratch, and it is hardly surprising that few have even attempted to do so. 
One significant initiative which should be mentioned is the Government of Pakistan's attempt to 
establish an Industrial Estate on the outskirts of Mirpur town. The aim is to encourage overseas 
Pakistanis to return to their country of birth, bringing their accumulated savings with them. 
Special incentives are 
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available, such as tax holidays, loan facilities, and the right to import machinery free of duty. 
Despite this, none of the enterprises so far established have been at all successful. Returnees 
constantly complain that official sponsorship is rarely as helpful as it might be, not least because 
officers generally expect 'presents' before they issue the necessary permits, documentation and so 
forth. (Manufacturers in Jullundur make similar complaints about government officials, and for 
that reason tend to keep clear of officially-aided schemes.) Even more deterring, however, is the 
lack of any real market either in raw materials, or labour, or for the finished goods themselves. 
The lesson to be learned here is that while returning migrants can join in with, and so further 
stimulate, an already thriving local economy, their prospects in an economy which has grown 
moribund through dependency are very poor indeed. 
Thus, Mirpuri migrants are victims of a double squeeze. Not only are they particularly exposed to 
the consequences of recession in Britain, but their prospects for economic success back home are 
much more limited than those of Jullunduris. This should not, however, lead us to conclude that 
conditions in Jullundur are anywhere near ideal. There, as elsewhere in the sub-continent, social 
inequality is still considerable, corruption widespread, and law and order most uncertain. It is not 
paradise. In terms of economic vitality, however, Jullundur emerges very positively in 
comparison with Mirpur: it has real prospects in the immediate future. If Jullundur has a better 
climate for growth, this can be attributed to two main factors. First, there is India's long-standing 
commitment to self-sufficiency, to swadesh, as the Mahatma put it: without this, development 
could not have taken place. Secondly, India has managed to sustain a degree of democracy, and 
though not without considerable flaws, this does mean that there have been some checks on the 
predatory tendencies of the urban elite. But in Pakistan these have largely been absent. 
Democracy has never taken hold, and the country's increasingly inegalitarian social order has 
been held firmly in place by the Army. 
Yet my argument here suggests that the whole structure of Pakistani society is becoming 
increasingly precarious. Given falling oil prices and a further decline in the demand for Pakistani 
labour overseas, leading to a swift drop in remittances, the consequences for the country's 
economy could be very severe indeed.15 
Conclusion: migration in a global context 
Migration is always a process. Migrants as individuals move from one place to another, and 
however distant these may be migrants and their families remain involved in both. Hence, 
analyses which limit their attention solely to what is going on at one end of the process are 
necessarily inadequate. My hope in writing this article is that it will help to repair inadequacies in 
current understandings of the significance of the South Asian presence in Britain. In doing so I 
hope I have shown not only that their 'background' is far more complex and varied that is 
commonly assumed, but that events there have a dynamic of their own within which migrants, 
and through them events in Britain, may play a significant part. In other words, processes at 
opposite ends of migratory chains should not be seen as independent of each other. 
This connection arises partly at an individual level, for most economic migrants, and many of 
their children, seek to keep their feet in both worlds. They are prepared to move themselves and 
their capital resources around in response to whatever they see as being their best interests. Over 
and above this, however, there is an interconnection at a structural level. Emigration from Mirpur 
and Jullundur – which, as we have seen, is long established and has involved moves to all five 
continents - is but a tiny segment of the world-wide flows of people in search of new and better 
opportunities. These enormous flows have been determined largely by developments in the global 
economic order. They began in the colonial period, produced a large movement into the 
metropolitan heartlands until technological changes halted the post-war 
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industrial boom in its tracks, and are now kept going by the demand for labour in the capital-rich 
but population-poor oil states. Just what will happen next is hard to predict, except that recent 
technological changes mean that, whatever enterprise one may have in mind, it will no longer be 
necessary to hire large amounts of labour to achieve one's goals. Could the history of mass 
migration be coming to an end? 
Migrant workforces are generally exploited but, as this article has shown, that exploitation can 
have many dimensions. With respect the current situation in Pakistan, European imperialism is 
not without its significance, but it is no longer necessarily the central axis of inequality. Migrant 
labour forces also suffer from the disadvantage of being external proletariats. Thus, Pakistani 
migrants in the Arab world are exploited, and relatively rightless, both where they work and 
where they live; but because of their dual externality they have great difficulty in organising in 
either direction. And yet members of external proletariats can often produce radical changes, at 
either end of the chain. Mahatma Gandhi himself cut his political teeth in South Africa, before 
going on to lead his country to independence. Ghadr began in California,16 and the first Pan-
African Congress was held in Manchester. Who knows what political movements may emerge 
from the contemporary Mirpuri and Jullunduri diasporas? 
The issues here are simultaneously economic and political, local and global. If the Jullunduri 
economy really does take off, large numbers of Jullunduris could well be drawn back home, 
bringing with them substantial economic, intellectual and professional resources. If this occurs 
Britain's loss will be India's gain, and the movement will be another item to add to the list in the 
current shift in the balance of power from West to East. If nothing else this should remind us of 
the importance of stepping back occasionally from our narrow British concerns. Migrants and 
their children rightly take a more global perspective, and so may be much more aware of the 
changing world than many of the natives amongst whom they have settled. 
 
Notes 
1. This article is based mainly on information which I gathered during fieldwork in Jullundur and Mirpur carried 
out between December 1981 and March 1982. 
2. Details of the earlier history of Sikh migration can be found in Johnson (1979), Morris (1968) and Khushwant 
Singh (1963). 
3. An excellent account of the logic of migration, as well as an analysis of just who departed and when can be found 
in Kessinger (1975). 
4. Virtually all occupations in Punjab are normatively hereditary, and linked with specific castes. In rural Jullundur 
the farmers are by far the largest such group. making up roughly 50 per cent of the population: virtually all 
farmers belong to the Jat caste. The Blacksmiths, Lohar, are closely associated with the Carpenters. Tarkhan, and 
today they form a single endogamous caste. The Ramgarhias, as they are known. are overwhelmingly Sikh, and 
make up about 7 per cent of the population. 
5. There is considerable literature on the social structure of Punjabi villages: cf. Kessinger (1975), Hershman (1981) 
and Pettigrew (1976). 
6. This is mainly, it would seem, because the pressure of population on the land is much less in Ludhiana than 
Jullundur. It is also worth noting that a fair number of Muslims from Ludhiana have come to Britain: but since 
the families fled at Partition, most now describe themselves a, Pakistanis. 
7. The relative status of many castes has changed dramatically as a result of the developments described here. So. 
however good a Jat farmer may feel now that he drives a tractor. he is in no position to patronise a 'low caste' 
Ramgarhia industrialist who now drives a car. Class divisions have also opened up within castes: but the fact that 
caste and occupation remain closely linked. mutual assistance between caste fellows in the pursuit and defence of 
scarce resources is regarded as normal, and endogamy remains tight, means that the caste system has been 
transformed, rather than undermined by recent social and political changes. 
135 
8. It is not without significance that 'visas' (as work permits are colloquially described) cost nearly twice as much in 
Pakistan as compared with India: excessive demand drives up the price. This also means that middlemen who sell 
'visas' to the highest bidders make much larger profits  in Pakistan than India. 
9. See Ballard and Ballard (1977). Saifullah Khan (1979) and Dahya (1971). For a whole variety of reasons Mirpuri 
men have been more reluctant to uproot their families and resettle them in Britain. During the past decade large 
numbers of Mirpuris have reunited their families. despite considerable harassment from the British Immigration 
Service. But in the Gulf there is generally no question of reuniting families. women and children have no 
alternative but to stay at home. 
10. The Government of Pakistan has been encouraged to adopt such a policy by the World Bank. its new President, 
Tom Clausen. has made a whole series of speeches suggesting that migrant remittances as well as Free Trade can 
playa major part in stimulating economic growth. 
11. An accurate comparison of prices in two different economies is always difficult to make. Officially the Pakistani 
rupee has been maintained at a slightly higher value than its Indian counterpart, but when the price of basic goods 
and services are compared. there is a strong case for suggesting that the Pakistani rupee is overvalued. perhaps by 
as much as 100 percent. To the extent that this is true migrants lose out because they are short-changed when 
they convert their earnings into rupees. Meanwhile, imported goods in Pakistan are made cheaper- than they 
might otherwise be. Moreover, the massive flow of remittances offer opportunities for the wealthier members of 
the elite to export their accumulated savings into safer havens overseas. 
12. There are some parallels to the processes described in Jullundur to be found in Pakistan. Thus. Gujrat has become 
a centre for the manufacture of electrical goods (especially fans) and Sialkot of surgical instruments. But the 
scale is nothing like so large. nor is there a link-up with the agricultural sector. 
13. The comparison I am drawing here is not so much between Jullundur or Mirpur. but between villages lying only 
a few miles apart on opposite sides of the border just south of Lahore and Amritsar. Comparison across this short 
geographical span is permissible: but if one tries to do so for both countries as wholes it must be borne in mind 
that there are dramatic differences in wealth between different geographical areas. 
14. These events have been extensively reported. and commented upon, in Britain's Urdu press 
15. Since this article was completed in October 1982, there have been a number of significant developments in the 
Middle East and most especially in India and Pakistan. 
16. A very active resistance movement emerged in Sindh, which the Pakistani authorities are repressing with some 
vigour. Sindhi grievances are similar to those of the Kashmiris, but to these must be added an overt hostility to 
the United States, which is perceived as backing the martial law regime. Pakistan has also increased its exports of 
military manpower. At least 50.000 members of the Pakistani armed forces are serving overseas. b% far the 
largest number in Saudi Arabia, where they provide a crucial element in the royal security forces. Not only do 
they contribute substantially to the flow of migrant remittances to Pakistan, but their presence helps to explain 
why there should be such a close alliance between the governments in Washington, Riyadh and Islamabad. 
17. There has also been considerable unrest in Indian Punjab. In part this is the outcome of local demands for greater 
autonomy from Central Government control. But since the Sikhs, and especially the Jat Sikhs. are making the 
running in pressing these demands. the latent tensions between rural Sikh farmers and urban Hindu businessmen 
have been greatly exacerbated. Considerable violence has ensued, but this does not seem to have seriously 
hindered economic growth. Sikhs overseas have taken a close interest in these events. Most are enthusiastic 
supporters of the Sikh cause. and in Canada a good deal of backing has been given to the idea of forming an 
independent Sikh state. 
18. See Johnston (1979). reviewed in New Community. Vol. IX. No. 3. 
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